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I. INTRODUCTION
United States v. Navajo NationI concerns the role of the Secretary of the
Interior in the management of Indian natural resources under the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA)2 . Conflicts and issues associated
with Indian sovereignty and United States trust obligations in resource
management are nuanced with history, statutory construction, and legisla-
tive intent. Disparate interpretations have led these conflicts to the court-
room. United States v. Navajo Nation deals particularly with the issue of
whether a tribe can recover money damages from the United States under
the IMLA for an alleged breach of trust relating to coal leases negotiated
between an Indian tribe and a private lessee.3 This case note will examine
the legal history and the specific facts to evaluate the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation and application of the governing law to the
facts in United States v. Navajo Nation.
* J.D. expected May 2007 University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana.
1. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a)-(g) (2000).
3. 537 U.S. at 493.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) officially marked the end
to the allotment era.4 Congress intended the IRA to foster both Indian eco-
nomic development and parity between Indians and whites by encouraging
Indian self-government and reducing tribal dependence on services and
benefits traditionally supplied by state governments. ' After passing the
IRA, Congress legislated and made policy for the Indian tribes, but left the
individual Indian in the care of the tribe.6 This was a significant policy
reversal in the face of over half a century of legislation and treaties aimed
specifically at assimilating Indians into western society and culture.
The IRA was intended to promote tribal self-government. It authorized
tribes to organize for their common welfare and adopt appropriate constitu-
tions and bylaws. These articles became effective upon ratification by ma-
jority vote of each tribe and upon approval by the Secretary of the Interior.7
Once incorporated under the IRA, a tribe was authorized to manage and
dispose of tribal property with certain limitations.8 Tribes that organized
governments under the IRA were vested with powers to prevent the lease of
tribal lands and assets without the consent of the tribe and could negotiate
with Federal, State, and local governments. 9
Under the IRA, however, tribal self-government was subject to broad
powers granted to the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary of the Inte-
rior controlled the organization of tribes incorporated under the IRA. The
Secretary approved tribal constitutions and bylaws, established the electoral
process, called elections, and certified tribal election results. 10 The Secre-
tary had authority to approve exchanges of land when the exchange was, in
the Secretary's judgment, expedient and beneficial.11 The Secretary was
also given authority to acquire interests in land, water rights, or surface
rights to provide land and resources for Indians. 12 Congress directed the
Secretary to establish regulations to manage Indian forestry units and live-
stock ranges.' 3  The IRA authorized the Secretary to restore subsurface
4. The allotment era began in 1887 when Congress enacted the General Allotment Act codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (2000). The allotment era came to a close with the passage of the Indian Reor-
ganization Act codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000). See Judith v. Royster, Mineral Development in
Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 Tulsa L.J. 541, 557
(1994).
5. Blackfeet Tribe v. Mont., 729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984) (hereinafter, Blackfeet Tribe).
6. US. v. St. Tax Commn. of Miss., 535 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1976).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 476(a)(1) (2000). "The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by any tribe,
issue a charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, that such charter shall not become operative
until ratified by the governing body of such tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).
8. In 1990, § 477 was amended limiting leases to "twenty-five years of any trust or restricted
lands" instead often years. Id.
9. 25 U.S.C. § 476(e) (2000).
10. 25 U.S.C. § 476(a)-(d) (2000).
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 463(e), 464(c) (2000).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2005).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 466 (2005).
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rights in mineral strip lands to tribal ownership regardless of whether an
entry of a claim had been made or mining operations had begun. '
4
Initially, the Trade and Nonintercourse Act of 1834 (TNIA) protected In-
dian mineral resources from non-Indian mining. TNIA required all pur-
chases, grants, leases, or other conveyance of property rights to be done by
treaty or convention. 15 Under TNIA, Indians could not authorize the alien-
ation of their land or resources.' 6  TNIA required explicit Congressional
approval for non-Indians to conduct mining operations on any lands held or
claimed by Indians. 17  Third parties who negotiated a lease directly with
Indian tribes were fined. 18  The United States used the threat of military
force to prevent settlers from trespassing and mining on Indian lands. In
1874 the United States Army was dispatched to the Black Hills of South
Dakota to prevent prospectors and settlers from trespassing on Indian
lands. "
During the allotment era, however, Congress passed a series of mineral
leasing acts that relaxed TNIA Congressional oversight of Indian land
transactions. These acts allowed alienation of minerals located in Indian
lands without Congressional sanction. The Act of February 28, 1891 al-
lowed mining on allotted lands bought and paid for by Indians "upon such
terms and conditions as the agent in charge may recommend." 20 These
leases were subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior and could be
assigned only to lands not needed for farming or other agricultural pur-
poses.
In the following years, Congress passed a series of acts that expanded
federal control. After allowing mineral leases on allotted lands upon the
approval of the Secretary, 22 Congress expanded mineral leasing to unallot-
ted lands 23 within Indian reservations in the western United States. 24 Con-
14. Rundle v. Udall, 379 F.2d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
15. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
16. U.S. v. Cook, 86 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1873).
17. Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 667 F.Supp. 938, 944 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County, 434 F.Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)).
18. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
19. The Black Hills were reserved to the Sioux by the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty. The
United States Army was obligated to prevent prospectors and settlers from trespassing and mining gold
on lands reserved to the Indians.
"[I]n September 1874, General Sheridan sent instructions to Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry...
directing him to use force to prevent companies of prospectors from trespassing on the Sioux Reserva-
tion. At the same time, Sheridan let it be known that he would "give a cordial support to the settlement
of the Black Hills," should Congress decide to "open up the country for settlement, by extinguishing the
treaty rights of the Indians."' U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1980) (citations
omitted).
20. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (2000).
21. Id.
22. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2000) (first enacted in 1909).
23. The General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), was enacted to break up Indian lands
reserved by treaty into private ownership. The allotted lands were held in trust with the intention that
they would then be patented in fee. Unallotted lands are those lands reserved under treaty to Indian
tribes, but not allotted under the General Allotment Act. See Royster, supra n. 4, at 549.
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gress extended lease terms from ten years to twenty, and outlined preferen-
tial rights in terms of mining locations and lease renewals. Congress also
eliminated the tribal consent requirement for leasing in a 1919 Act and au-
thorized the Secretary of the Interior to lease any part of unallotted Indian
reservation lands in western states.25
Later amendments empowered the Secretary of the Interior to lease tribal
oil and gas. This flurry of Congressional activity, in some instances, re-
sulted in non-Indians acquiring significant Indian mineral resources.
26
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) was passed, in part, to
advance tribal independence and to establish tribal control over mineral
leasing.27 Congress cited three purposes for enacting IMLA: (1) to achieve
uniformity in tribal leasing matters; (2) to increase Indian authority in
granting leases; and (3) to protect Indians' economic return on their prop-
28erty. Passage of the IMLA was consistent with the IRA because, while it
involved tribal governments in the leasing process, it brought all leasing
activities under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. The IMLA
required Indians to authorize the lease of unallotted tribal land within the
reservation for mining and required the Secretary of the Interior to approve
the lease.2 9 A lease could not become effective under IMLA without both
the tribe's authorization and the Secretary's approval of the lease.30
The IMLA and administrative regulations required that leases be offered
for sale to the highest responsible qualified bidder at public auction or on
sealed bids, following proper notice and advertisement. The Secretary of
the Interior had the right to reject all bids when it would be in the interest of
the Indians to do so. In the event that no satisfactory bid was received, or if
the Secretary of the Interior determined that to accept the highest bid would
not be in the best interest of the Indians, the Secretary could re-advertise
such lease for sale.3' The IMLA and associated regulations established
uniformity in the leasing process by outlining procedures and requirements
for awarding and negotiating the sale of leases.32 Although the provisions
of the IMLA and the administrative regulations required an Indian tribe's
approval to grant any right to mine on Indian reservation land, the Secretary
24. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2000) (first enacted in 1938).
25. The Secretary of the Interior could lease any part of the unallotted lands on any Indian reserva-
tion within the States of Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Washing-
ton, or Wyoming. 25 U.S.C. § 399 (2000) (first enacted in 1919).
26. Royster, supra n. 4, at 550.
27. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a)-(g) (2000).
28. Blackfeet Tribe, 729 F.2d at 1199 (citing Sen. Rpt. 75-985 at 2 (July 22, 1937)); accord H.R.
Rpt. 75-1872 at 1-2 (Mar. 3, 1938).
29. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2000).
30. 25 C.F.R. § 211.20 (2004).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 396(b) (2000). Although the public auction and bidding requirements in § 396(b)
only reference leases for oil and gas, similar bidding practices have been extended to mineral leases
through administrative regulations. 25 C.F.R. § 211.20 (2004); see also 25 C.F.R. § 211.2 (1985).
32. Royster, supra n. 4, at 560.
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of the Interior, as trustee for the Indians, retained extensive authority over
the leasing process including the authority to cancel issued permits.
33
Despite the controlling authority of the Government over Indian lands
and affairs, there was little recourse for Indian tribes in the event of mis-
management by the Secretary. The United States cannot be sued without its
consent. 34 However, in 1887, Congress passed the Tucker Act which al-
lowed non-Indian parties to assert claims against the Government founded
upon the Constitution, any Act of Congress, or any administrative regula-
tion. It also included claims based upon contracts with the United States.35
It was not until the passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1946
that the United States waived immunity for similar claims made by Indi-
ans. 36 The Indian Claims Commission Act is commonly referred to as the
Indian Tucker Act because it established for Indians the same opportunities
provided in the Tucker Act. After the passage of the Indian Claims Act, it
was no longer necessary for Congress to pass special jurisdictional acts for
Indians to secure a court's judicial determination on any misappropriation
of Indian funds or property by federal officials.37
While Congress intended to encourage tribal self-government, the law
has sometimes failed to support that goal. Although some decisions on the
judicial battlefield have resulted in recognition of tribal rights to sue the
Secretary of the Interior for damages for breach of trust duties, 38 other deci-
sions have denied breach of trust claims based upon fine distinctions.
39
These seemingly contradictory decisions demonstrate the need to sharpen
the boundaries between tribal rights and the fiduciary responsibilities of the
United States.
III. THE FACTS OF UNITED STATES V. NA VAJO NATION
The Navajo Nation occupies the largest Indian reservation in the United
States, encompassing over 25,000 square miles of land. 40 The reservation
itself is larger than ten of the fifty United States, extending into parts of
Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. There is significant mineral, oil, and
33. In NRG Co. v. U.S., the United States Claims Court held that although tribal approval is neces-
sary for a lease of Indian land, the tribe was deemed to have given its approval for the ultimate grant of a
lease when it signed and issued prospecting permits. Cancellation of the permits was exclusively within
the authority of the Secretary of the Interior. NRG Co. v. U.S., 24 Ct. Cl. 51 (1991).
34. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 502 (citing U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)
(Mitchell 17)).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000).
37. Although the Indian Tucker Act confers jurisdiction, it is not a source for substantive rights.
Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 214; U.S. v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (Mitchell 1). See also 92 Cong.
Rec. 5313 (1946).
38. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968); see also Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. 206; Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 553 (1962); 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
39. See generally e.g. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535.
40. Petr.'s Br. at 4 (Aug. 19, 2002), U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
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natural gas wealth on Navajo reservation.' It is reported that coal mined
upon the reservation is of exceptional quality and economic value due to
high BTU content, low sulfur content, and a favorable mass ratio of coal
mine to waste removed.42 Each year, the Navajo Nation receives tens of
millions of dollars in royalty payments. The Tribe relies heavily upon this
revenue to provide basic services, to build up badly needed reservation in-
frastructure, and support a self-sustaining economy.
The United States supervises mineral leasing on the reservation under the
IMLA and the regulations promulgated under the Act.44 Peabody Coal
Company (Peabody) mined coal on the reservation under leases covered by
the IMLA.45 Lease 8580 was negotiated between the Tribe and Peabody 4
and approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1964.47 At the time of the
lease, the administrative rules established minimum royalty rates at ten
cents per ton. 48 Lease 8580 established the royalty rate payable to the Na-
vajo Tribe at thirty-seven and a half cents per ton. 49 Further, the lease pro-
vided that "the royalty provisions of [Lease 8580] are subject to reasonable
adjustment by the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representa-
tive." 50 Any adjustment was to occur upon the twenty-year anniversary of
the lease. Further adjustments could be made every ten years thereafter.5 '
In 1975, Congress established a minimum rate for coal mined on federal
lands.52 This rate differed materially from those set by the Secretary of the
Interior. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 (FCLA) set
minimum rates as percentages of the gross proceeds and thus provided for
market and economic fluctuations.53 Meanwhile, the minimum rates for
mineral leases on Indian lands remained static and inflexible. A side-by-
side comparison of the flexible federal land minimum rates with the rigid
and static Indian land rates revealed significant inequity. In particular, near
41. Id.
42. Respt.'s Br. at 2 (Oct. 9, 2002), U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
43. Id.
44. See also 25 U.S.C. §396(a)-(g) (2000); Petr.'s Br. at 2-3 (Aug. 19, 2002), U.S. v. Navajo Na-
tion, 537 U.S. 488.
45. Peabody entered into three coalmining leases with the Navajo Nation. Two of these leases,
Lease 9910 and Lease 5743, contained higher royalty rates than the lease at issue in this case, however
neither had a provision for royalty rate review. See Petr.'s Br. at 4 (Aug. 19, 2002), US. v. Navajo
Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
46. Peabody executed the lease through its predecessor in interest, the Sentry Royalty Company.
Petr.'s Br. at 4 (Aug. 19, 2002), Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
47. Petr.'s Br. at 4 (Aug. 19, 2002), U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488; Respt.'s Br. at 2 (Oct. 9,
2002), US. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
48. 25 C.F.R. § 211.15(c) (1985).
49. Petr.'s Br. at 4 (Aug. 19, 2002), US. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488; Respt.'s Br. at 2 (Oct. 9,
2002), US. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
50. Petr.'s Br. at 4 (Aug. 19, 2002), US. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
51. Id.
52. 30 U.S.C. 207(a) (2000).
53. 30 U.S.C. 207(a) (established the minimum rates on coal mine on federal lands at twelve and
half percent (12.5%) of the gross proceeds).
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the twenty-year anniversary of Lease 8580, the lease royalty rate was the
equivalent of two percent of the gross proceeds on the lease, as opposed to
the twelve and a half percent minimum set by the FCLA. 
54
The tribe made efforts to renegotiate existing mineral leases with Pea-
body and others. 55 Lease 8580 provided for reasonable adjustment of the
contractual royalty rate by the Secretary of the Interior. In March of
1984, the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council wrote to the Secretary of
the Interior and asked him to adjust the royalty rate of Lease 8580 under his
contractually conferred authority. 57 Three months later, in an opinion letter
dated June 18, 1984, Donald Dodge, Director of the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs for the Navajo Area, notified Peabody that the royalty rate would be
raised to twenty percent (20%) of the gross proceeds.58
In July 1984, Peabody filed an administrative appeal contesting the rate
determination. While the appeal was pending, Peabody's Vice President
wrote to Interior Secretary Donald Hodel and asked him to either postpone
the decision to allow the parties to seek a negotiated settlement or rule in
Peabody's favor. 59 The Tribe reacted by urging Secretary Hodel to reject
the request made by Peabody and release an immediate decision in favor of
the royalty rate increase.6°
In July 1985, Peabody representatives met privately with Secretary Ho-
del. No notice of the meeting was given to the tribe. 61 Secretary Hodel
issued a memorandum on July 17, 1985 informing the parties that a deci-
sion was not imminent and instructing his Deputy Assistant, John Fritz, to
urge the parties to continue with negotiations. In the memo he wrote that it
"was not intended as determination of the merits of the arguments of the
parties to the appeal. 62 Secretary Hodel feared that any royalty adjustment
without the agreement of the parties would be costly in terms of appeals
and would ultimately injure the relationship between the parties.
63
On September 23, 1985, Peabody and the Navajo Nation reached a tenta-
tive agreement on amendments to Lease 8580. The amendments raised the
royalty rates to match those that were customary on other Indian and federal
54. Petr.'s Br. at 5 (Aug. 19, 2002), U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, (Lease 8580 royalties on
mined coal was seventeen and a half (17.5) cents more per ton than the regulatory minimum and still
resulted in an amount of about two percent (2%) of gross proceeds).
55. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 496.
56. Id. at 495.
57. Id. at 496; Petr.'s Br. at 5 (Aug. 19, 2002), U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, (The Chair-
man maintained that simple equity required that the royalty rate should not be less than the twelve and a
half percent (12.5%) provided for under federal coal leases. The Chairman also sought the Secretary's
assistance in securing a voluntary adjustment of the mineral royalties of Leases 9910 and 5743).
58. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 496; Petr.'s Br. at 6 (Aug. 19, 2002), U.S. v. Navajo Nation,
537 U.S. 488.
59. Id. at 496.
60. Id. at 497.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 498.
63. Id. at 497.
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lands and recognized the legitimacy of tribal taxation of coal productions.
Taxes were capped by stipulation at eight percent. Peabody pledged addi-
tional compensation to the Navajo Nation upon amendment approval.
Other matters including provisions for future royalty adjustments, payment
of back royalties, arbitration procedures, and the establishment of a tribal
scholarship fund were also addressed in the agreement. 64 As part of the
agreement, the parties moved jointly to vacate the June 1984 decision that
raised the royalty rate to twenty percent.65
The Navajo Tribal Council approved the amendments in August 1987.
In November 1987 the Navajo Nation and Peabody signed the final agree-
ment and on November 26, 1987 the agreement was officially forwarded to
the Department of the Interior for its review and approval as required by
IMLA.66 Although Lease 8580 had undergone a long negotiation process
and resulted in significantly updated lease terms, the review process was
completed quickly over the Thanksgiving holiday. Secretary Hodel for-
mally approved the lease amendments on December 14, 1987. On Decem-
ber 18, the royalty adjustment of twenty percent, dating back to June 18,
1984, was formally vacated. 67
Although the parties reached an agreement regarding the lease, the nego-
tiation process and the actions of the Department of the Interior acting as
trustee for the Navajo Nation warrant examination. The Navaho Nation
brought a claim against the Government alleging that Secretary Hodel com-
promised his trust obligations to the tribe when the Secretary met secretly
with parties having interests adverse to their trust beneficiary and then mis-
led the beneficiary concerning those events and interests. The Navajo Na-
tion posed that question before the Court of Federal Claims.
68
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1993, the Navajo Nation filed a complaint alleging that the Secretary's
approval of the amendments to Lease 8580 constituted a breach of trust.
69
The Government and the Navajo Nation both filed motions for summary
judgment.7°
The United States argued that the Navajo Nation lacked standing because
the Government owed neither a contractual nor fiduciary duty to the Navajo
Nation that could be judicially enforced. 71 The Federal Claims Court could
not justify compensation for the Government's fiduciary wrongs. The
64. Navajo Nation v. US., 46 Fed.CI. 217, 223-24 (2000).
65. US. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 500.
66. Id.
67. Navajo Nation v. U.S., 46 Fed. C1. at 224.
68. Respt.'s Br. 13 (Oct. 9, 2002), U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
69. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 500.
70. Navajo Nation v. U.S., 46 Fed. CI. at 219.
71. Id. at 220.
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Court found the lack of a trust relationship dispositive.72 Granting the
United States' motion for summary judgment, The United States Court of
Federal Claims concluded:
The facts of this case show that the Secretary acted in the
best interests of [Peabody] and not in the interests of the
beneficiary to whom he owed a fiduciary duty-a classic
violation of common law fiduciary obligations. Nonethe-
less, the Navajo Nation has failed to present statutory au-
thority which can be fairly interpreted as mandating com-
pensation for the government's fiduciary wrongs. [The
United States] has thus established its right to judgment as
a matter of law. Further, the Court finds that the govern-
ment did not enter into a contract with Navajo Nation either
by the express terms of Lease 8580 or by implication. 73
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Federal Claims Court.
It held that although the United States has only a limited trust relationship
with the Indian tribes who occupy reservation lands, a fiduciary duty to-
ward the Indians may arise from both specific laws and the level of control
exercised by the United States in managing land and resources for the bene-
fit of the Indians.74 The Court determined that the statutes and regulations
that require the Secretary of the Interior to authorize and supervise leasing
activities, as a matter of law, assign to the Secretary control of Indian min-
eral leasing activities. The court observed that no significant authority re-
mained in the hands of the Indian tribes. All leasing procedures and re-
sponsibilities were prescribed by Act of Congress and in the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.75
The Appellate Court concluded that, as a matter of law, the United States
had fiduciary obligations to the Navajo Nation in connection with the coal
leases and that a claim for damages for the breach of those obligations was
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The court held that
summary judgment in favor of the United States based upon the Navajo
Nation's lack of standing was improper and that the Navajo Nation was
72. The court concluded, "[T]he defendant, acting through former Secretary Hodel, violated the
most basic common law fiduciary duties owed the Navajo Nation. Regrettably, we also conclude that
the trust relationship necessary for our jurisdiction does not exist, and these violations do not mandate
monetary relief, both as required by our jurisdictional precedents. We also conclude that the government
owed no contractual duty to the plaintiff. We are thus compelled to deny plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment and to grant the government's cross-motion." Id. at 219.
73. Navajo Nation v. US., 46 Fed.Cl. at 236.
74. Navajo Nation v. US., 263 F.3d 1325, 1329 (2001) (The Court pointed out that the difference
lies in the level of control the United States exercises in its management of the land and its resources for
the benefit of the Indians. "When the United States controls the Indian resources, the duty is that of a
fiduciary; when the Indians control their own resources, the duty of the United States is lessened appro-
priately").
75. Navajo Nation v. U.S., 263 F.3d at 1331.
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entitled to a determination of damages.76 The Court of appeals denied a
rehearing and a rehearing en banc. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed. 77
V. THE SUPREME COURT MAJORITY HOLDING
The issue upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court was whether
the Navajo Nation had stated a claim against the United States that was
judicially enforceable. The Court recognized that for the United States
Federal Claims Court to have jurisdiction, the claim must arise under the
Constitution, the laws or treaties of the United States, Executive Orders of
the President, or would have to be otherwise cognizable in the Federal
Claims Court regardless of whether the claimant was an Indian Tribe, band,
or group.78
For the courts to recognize a claim as judicially enforceable, mere juris-
diction and the general trust relationship between the United States and the
tribes are not enough. To have standing, the plaintiffs must invoke a rights-
creating source of substantive law that "can fairly be interpreted as mandat-
ing compensation by the federal government for the damages sustained.
7 9
The Indian Tucker Act alone is insufficient, 80 although it does provide the
necessary waiver of sovereign immunity. 81 The Court ruled that tribes must
identify a source of law that established specific fiduciary or other duties,
and must allege that the government failed to perform those duties. 82 Once
a source of law is identified, the Court must determine whether, as a matter
of law, it can be "fairly interpreted as mandating compensation for dam-
ages.,, 83 Analysis of the Court must follow specific rights-creating or duty-
imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions.8 4
Within this rule construct, the question of whether the Navajo Nation had
stated a claim against the United States that was judicially enforceable
turned on whether the IMLA and the regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary of the Interior could be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation
for the Government's alleged breach of trust regarding Lease 8580. The
Court held that they could not.85
76. Id. at 1333.
77. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 502.
78. The United States may not be sued without its consent. The existence of consent is a prerequi-
site for jurisdiction. Id. at 502-503. See also Claims Commission Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000).
79. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 503 (quoting Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 218).
80. Supra n. 38.
81. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 503; Mitchell H, 463 U.S. at 215; see also 92 Cong. Rec.
5313 (1946); Mitchell 1, 445 U.S., at 538.
82. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 506.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 217 (The court noted that although the requirements call for
rights-creating or duty-imposing statutes or regulations, money damages may be inferred from such
prescriptions and need not be provided for expressly).
85. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 506.
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The Court found that the IMLA does not contain, within its provisions or
implementing regulations, substantive law that mandates compensation
because neither the Act nor the regulations impose fiduciary obligations.
The Court found that, although the IMLA requires the Secretary to approve
coal-mining leases negotiated between tribes and third parties before such
leases become effective, this does not impute full responsibility to manage
Indian resources for the Indians' benefit. 86 The Court determined that the
IMLA does no more than establish a bare minimum royalty and cannot be
construed as requiring the Secretary to conduct an independent economic
analysis of a royalty mutually agreed upon through negotiations between
the tribe and a third party.
87
In regard to Secretary Hodel's intervention as it related to the negotiation
of Lease 8580, the Court held that it could not, absent a relevant statute or
regulation, conclude that his conduct constituted a breach of a duty for
which damages are an appropriate remedy.88
VI. DISCUSSION OF CONTROLLING LAW
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Mitchell I and Mitchell H regard-
ing Government management of Indian resources constitute the controlling
law in United States v. Navajo Nation. 89 They are the "pathmarking prece-
dents" on the questions of whether statutes or regulations can be interpreted
as mandating compensations by the federal government. 9°
A. Mitchell I
Mitchell I addressed alleged mismanagement of timber resources under
the General Allotment Act of 1887 (GAA). 91 The GAA authorized the
President to allot specified acreage of agricultural and grazing land within a
reservation to each Indian residing on that reservation. Title to allotted
lands was kept by the United States, and the land was held in trust 92 for the
benefit of the allottees. 93
The plaintiffs in Mitchell I were descendants of the Indians of several
tribes who originally occupied the Pacific coastal region north of the Co-
86. "The Secretary is neither assigned a comprehensive managerial role nor ... expressly invested
with responsibility to secure the 'needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs."' Id. at 507
(quoting Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 224 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 406(a))).
87. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 511.
88. ld. at 514.
89. Id. at 493.
90. Id. at 503.
91. Id. at 503-504; General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq. (1976 ed.) (as
amended); Mitchell , 445 U.S. at 536-37.
92. Senator Dawes made an amendment to the GAA in 1882 to include the provision that the
United States would hold the allotted lands in trust so that the land would be protected from state taxa-
tion. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 543-44.
93. Mitchelll, 445 U.S. at 536-37, 540-41.
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lumbia River. In 1859, the Government ratified the Treaty of Olympia, 94 in
which some 200,000 acres within the Quinaults' territory was reserved to
the tribe. Because the reservation land was heavily forested, none of the
non-Quinault Indians moved to the reservation. 95
Pursuant to the Treaty of Olympia, an Executive Order, and the GAA,
the Government began, in 1905, to allot land within the reservation in trust
to individual Indians, including Indians who relocated to the reservation.
By 1933, the reservation had been completely allotted. Each allottee re-
ceived a deed stating that the United States would hold the allotted land in
trustfor twenty-five years for the sole use and benefit of the Indian and his
heirs. 96 Although it was intended that allottees would reside on their allot-
ments and farm or raise livestock, it was practically impossible to do so
because the land was so heavily forested. The allotted land was largely
useless, except for timber resources. 
97
The allottees brought claims against the United States to recover dam-
ages for alleged mismanagement of timber resources found on the reserva-
tion. The Indian claimants asserted standing based upon the jurisdictional
rule found in the Indian Claims Commission Act which requires that claims
arise under the Constitution, laws, treaties, or Executive orders of the Presi-
dent98 for substantive rights enforceable against the United States for
money damages. 99 The Court of Claims held that the GAA created a fidu-
ciary duty on the part of the United States to manage the timber resources
properly. The Court of Claims assumed jurisdiction and recognized the
Indian claimants' standing.' 00
Upon appeal, however, the Supreme Court determined that two facts
conclusively established that the GAA did not create a fiduciary duty. First,
the Act indicated that the Indian allottee, and not a United States represen-
tative, was responsible for using and managing the land. 101 Second, the
Act contained no provisions directing the Secretary how to manage Indian
resources. 102
The Court announced that the GAA does not unambiguously provide that
the United States has undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities regarding the
management of allotted lands. It determined the GAA indicated the Indian
94. Respt. Br. at 2 (Sept. 24, 1979), Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535.
95. Id. at 3.
96. ld. at 3.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Indian Claims Commission Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000).
99. In U.S. v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976), the Court stated that "[T]he Tucker Act, of course,
is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the
United States for money damages. The Court of Claims has recognized that the Act merely confers
jurisdiction upon it whenever the substantive right exists" (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. U.S., 372 F.2d
1002, 1007-1009 (1967)).
100. Mitchell1, 445 U.S. at 537-38.
101. ld.at542-43.
102. Id. at 545.
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allottee would occupy the land as a homestead for his personal use in agri-
culture and grazing. The allotments were selected by the individual Indians
to secure the improvements made by the individual Indian to their land al-
lotment. Consequently, the Court held that the Indian allottee, and not a
representative of the Government, was responsible for the use and disposi-
tion of the allotted land. o3
With regard to the United States' policy of holding Indian lands in trust,
the Court pointed to the congressional record and determined that Con-
gress's intent was merely to prevent alienation of the Indian lands and im-
munize the land from state taxation. Congress did not intend to have the
Government control use of the land and be subject to money damages for
breach of fiduciary duty. The Court noted that subsequent legislation, and
not the GAA, empowered the Secretary of the Interior to sell timber on un-
allotted lands and apply all net proceeds to the benefit of the Indians, and
authorized the Secretary to consent to the sale of timber sales by the owner
of Indian land held in trust. 104
Because the GAA lacked express provisions indicating that the United
States was to manage Indian resources, the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Claims. In conclusion, the court wrote, "[a]ny right of the [Indi-
ans] to recover money damages for Government mismanagement must be
found in some source other than the Act."'
10 5
B. Mitchell H
Three years later, a source of substantive rights other than the GAA was
found in Mitchell I1.106 The Court concluded that timber management stat-
utes and regulations were sufficient to establish comprehensive Govern-
ment responsibilities ii managing and harvesting Indian timber.10 7 The
Court also recognized fiduciary responsibilities arising from Government
control and management relating to rights-of way. 
08
Statutes and regulations outlined the Secretary's responsibilities in regard
to timber management. °9 Because Congress recognized that timber was
often the only valuable part of an allotment and the only source of revenue
from the allotment for the support of the Indian, Congress empowered the
Secretary of the Interior to sell the timber on Indian lands. " 0
The Department of the Interior promulgated regulations that detailed the
Department's management responsibilities and control over Indian for-
103. Id. at 542-43.
104. Id. at 545.
105. Id. at 546.
106. Mitchell11, 463 U.S. at 228.
107. Id. at 222 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-407, 466 (1982); 25 C.F.R. Part 163 (1982); White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)).
108. Id. at 223.
109. 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-407 (2000) (amended 1964).
110. Mitchell!l, 463 U.S. at 219-20.
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ests. 111 The regulations addressed nearly every aspect of forest manage-
ment including the size of sales, contract procedures, advertisements, meth-
ods of billing, deposits, bonding requirements, administrative fees and de-
ductions, procedures for sales by minors, allowable heights of tree stumps,
rules for marking and scaling trees, allowable tree diameters, and the per-
centage of trees to be left as a seed source. Secretarial approval of timber
sales was expressly conditioned upon compliance with these regulations. 112
Congress expressly directed the Department of the Interior to manage In-
dian forest resources on the principle of sustained-yield management."
13
This method mandated the proper and permanent management of the Indian
forests to "assure that the Indian forests will be permanently productive and
will yield continuous revenue to the tribes." 114
The regulations promulgated under the 1934 Act were specific and com-
prehensive to assure that Indians received the benefit of profits realized
through the management of the forest. Specifically, the regulations forbade
clear-cutting of large contiguous areas, and required timber companies log-
ging Indian forests to develop long-term working plans for major reserva-
tions, revegetate timber harvest areas, and mitigate erosion and soil trans-
portation. 115
The Court found that the Department of Interior's control over grants of
rights-of-way on Indian lands held in trust was indicative of a trust relation-
ship. Congress empowered the Secretary to grant rights-of-way so long as
the tribal or individual Indian landowner consented and received appropri-
ate compensation. 116 Regulations required applicants for a right-of-way to
deposit an amount not less than the fair market value of the rights granted,
plus an amount to cover potential damages associated with activity on the
right-of-way with the Secretary. The Secretary determined the adequacy of
the compensation and kept a special account to hold deposits for distribu-
tion to Indian landowners. 117
The Court distinguished Mitchell I from Mitchell II. The Tribal claim-
ants in Mitchell II were successful because, unlike the bare trust created by
the GAA in Mitchell I, the statutes and regulations cited in Mitchell II
clearly vested the Government with full responsibility to manage Indian
resources and Indian land for the benefit of the Indians. The Court ex-
plained that a fiduciary relationship arises by necessity when the Govern-
ment assumes the elaborate control demonstrated above. The Court noted
that although the trust relationship between the United States and the Indi-
ans is a limited one, in Mitchell II "[a]ll necessary elements of a common-
111. Id. at 220.
112. Id.
113. 25 U.S.C. § 466; Mitchell t, 463 U.S. at 221.
114. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 221, (quoting 78 Cong. Rec. 11730 (1934)).
115. Id. at 221-22.
116. Id. at 223.
117. Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 169.12, 169.14 (1982)).
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law trust [were] present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the
Indian allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber lands and funds).' '
Based on the regulations and the facts, the Court determined a fiduciary
relationship existed. 19 These obligations are reinforced by the existence of
a general trust obligation between the United States and the Indian Peo-
ple. 120
The Court held that the statutes and regulations established fiduciary ob-
ligations that can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation. The
Court held that because of the trust relationship, the Government should be
liable for damages sustained as a result of the breach of its fiduciary duties.
In so holding, the Court reinforced that a fundamental right incident to the
existence of a trust relationship is the right for the injured beneficiary to sue
the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust.' 2' The Court
asserted that recognizing a remedy of money damages furthers the purposes
of the statutes and regulations by deterring trust violations by federal offi-
cials and by giving the Indians retrospective recourse for government
breaches of trust obligations. 
22
VII. ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Navajo Na-
tion correctly. Neither the IMLA nor the associated regulations are sub-
stantive sources of law that establish specific fiduciary duties as required by
Mitchell I and Mitchell II.
The Court in Navajo Nation was correct when it held that the IMLA and
its implementing regulations do not impose obligations of the detailed kind
that existed in Mitchell II.123 In Mitchell II, a network of statutes and regu-
lations imposed judicially enforceable fiduciary duties. 124 In contrast, the
IMLA and its associated statutory scheme, when viewed in its entirety, does
not appear to provide any substantive law that creates fiduciary duties. The
IMLA states that unallotted lands within any Indian reservation may be
leased for mining purposes by authority of the tribal council or other au-
thorized spokesperson. There are three limitations on such leases. First,
the Secretary of the Interior must approve the lease. Second, the lease
terms cannot exceed ten years. And finally, the lease can be extended only
118. Id. at 224-25; see also Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts § 2 cmt. h (1959); Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law of Trusts § 2 cmt. f (2001).
119. "The language of these statutory and regulatory provisions directly supports the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. For example, § 8 of the 1910 Act, as amended, expressly mandates that sales of
timber from Indian trust lands be based upon the Secretary's consideration of 'the needs and best inter-
ests of the Indian owner and his heirs' and that proceeds from such sales be paid to owners 'or disposed
of for their benefit.' 25 U.S.C. § 406(a)." Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
120. Mitchell I1, 463 U.S. at 225.
121. Id. at 226.
122. Id. at 226-27.
123. U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 507.
124. Id. at 504-05.
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as long as minerals are produced in paying quantities.1 25 The statute is si-
lent on other obligations relating to mineral leasing.
The Tribe cannot rely on the United States Code section that addresses
the leasing authority of the Secretary of the Interior to lease unallotted min-
eral lands withdrawn from entry under mining laws. 126 Although this sec-
tion was enacted some twenty years before the IMLA, and has provisions
that impose fiduciary responsibilities, Section 399 is not part of the IMLA
and does not address the approval authority of the Secretary of the Interior
and therefore does not govern Lease 8580. Section 399 addresses leasing
authority. The distinction between broad leasing authority and limited ap-
proval authority is significant. Leasing authority necessarily establishes a
fiduciary responsibility because it assumes complete control on behalf of
the Indian or tribe. Approval authority is by nature more limited in scope.
It does not carry the same level of responsibility as leasing authority unless
legislation or enabling rules to the contrary exist. '27
Unlike the regulations in Mitchell II, which, when viewed with their as-
sociated legislation, enunciated a substantive duty, the Department of the
Interior regulations governing the implementation of the IMLA does not
create a fiduciary duty. The regulations, like the IMLA itself, indicate that
an Indian Tribe may lease the land subject only to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior's approval of the lease. 128 Although it should be noted that the Code of
Federal Regulations prescribes specific procedures for bids, 29 these are
inapplicable to the negotiated lease at issue in United States v. Navajo Na-
tion. In regard to negotiated leases, the code provides only that negotiated
leases can be rejected by the Secretary of the Interior and be advertised for
bids. 130 This "up or down" approval authority does not rise to the level of
control contemplated by the court in Mitchell I.
While it is true that administrative regulations outline the processes and
requirements for bonds and the manner of lease payments, these regulations
differ materially from those cited in Mitchell II. The regulations propagated
under the IMLA are not substantive in nature; they are procedural and do
not rise to the level creating fiduciary duties. These procedural rules re-
garding bonds, bidding, and manner of payments do not reflect an affirma-
tive assumption of a fiduciary duty as do the rules in Mitchell II. The pol-
icy to manage the resources in order to secure the needs and best interests
of the Indian owner and his heirs permeated the code regulations in Mitchell
JJ.131 That policy is absent in United States v. Navajo Nation. In its place
is the policy of tribal self-government.
125. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2000).
126. 25 U.S.C. § 399(2000).
127. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 542.
128. 25 C.F.R. § 211.20(a) (1985).
129. See 25 C.F.R. § 211.20 (1985).
130. 25 C.F.R. § 211.20 (1985).
131. MitchelllI, 436 U.S. at 224.
[Vol. 27
UBI JUS INCERTUM IBI JUS NULL UM
The provisions of the IMLA and implementing regulations closely re-
semble the GAA. Like the GAA in Mitchell I, the IMLA does not assign a
managerial role over coal leasing to the Secretary of the Interior. Although
the reservation land and resources are held in trust, Congress did not intend
for the government to manage the mineral resources of the Indians. That
authority was left to the tribes in order to promote self-determination and
self-government.
The IMLA and associated regulations are not substantive sources of law
that establish specific fiduciary duties. Congress was deliberate in limiting
the control of the Secretary to approving mineral leases. The Department of
Interior regulations are procedural, not substantive. Neither the IMLA nor
the regulations meet the threshold requirement of establishing specific fidu-
ciary duties required for the Navajo Nation to state a judicially enforceable
claim against the United States.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Navajo
Nation was consistent with the rule it announced in Mitchell I and rein-
forced in Mitchell II. As the issues surrounding Indian sovereignty regard-
ing Indian resources are raised, the trust relationship between the United
States and the Indian nations will become, by necessity, more clearly de-
fined. Certainly, the law is far from settled. Mitchell I and Mitchell II are
indicative of the distinctions made by the Supreme Court in regard to fidu-
ciary duties owed by the Government to the tribes. The historical and
loosely defined trust relationship between the United States and Indian
Tribes must be balanced in context with statutory construction and legisla-
tive intent.
By adopting the legal rule of Mitchell I and distinguishing the facts of
Mitchell II, the Supreme Court appears to require a clear manifestation of
intent to create a specific fiduciary relationship between Indian Tribes and
the United States on the part of the Government. 132 It appears that the his-
torical "trust relationship" is insufficient to support a true fiduciary duty.
As it relates to the Indian resources, the legal maxim rings true: Ubijus
incertum, ibijus nullum. 
133
132. See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts § 2 cmt. k (1959).
133. "Where the right is uncertain, there is no right." Black's Law Dictionary 1695 (Bryan A. Gar-
ner ed., 7th ed., West 1999).
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